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COMMON LAW TRUSTS AS BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES
ROBERT C. BROWN*
A generation ago the "trust problem" was under very active
discussion in this country both by the legal profession and by
the general public. The word "trust" had deviated widely from
its original meaning to designate one of the most unique and
highly beneficial devices of courts of equity-though it is
probable that few of the laity had ever heard of this primary
meaning-and had become a synonym for those monopolistic
combinations which were believed to menace the normal eco-
nomic development, and possibly the political freedom, of the
country.
As is quite generally known, the designation of these com-
binations by the term "trusts," was largely a historical accident.
In the beginning of the development, a few of the most promi-
nent of these organizations actually adopted the trust form, in
that stock of constituent corporations was put into the hands
of trustees who were to manage the entire enterprise. Later a
holding corporation was more generally used and at times the
constituent corporations were dissolved or became mere shells.
But during the entire period the term "trusts" continued to be
applied to these monopolies not merely by the public but by
the legal profession, and the statutes enacted against them
were frequently called "anti-trust laws."'
Meanwhile, the courts, with or without the aid of statutes,
applied themselves with great vigor to doing away with such
* See biographical note, p. 649.
1 For example the "Sherman Anti-Trust Law."
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trusts. Dissolution decrees were frequent,2 though the sub-
stantial economic effect of these activities is problematical. But
at any rate the trust problem is today one which creates little
public interest and, perhaps for that reason, causes compara-
tively little judicial activity. Whether it is because the present
generation thinks the existing monopolies are well behaved or
because we do not feel that substantial monopoly is now pos-
sible except with respect to public utilities, which are supposedly
under governmental regulation, it is certain that the trust prob-
lem is not one which even the most astute political spell-binder
can use to much advantage at present. To the ordinary "man
of the street" the trust has almost ceased to exist. Not so to
the courts nor to business men, either, for there is evident a
considerable tendency toward the formation of trusts for carry-
ing on ordinary businesses. These trusts are not formed for
monopolistic purposes-though of course that may be the pur-
pose and if so they would be subject to such statutes and com-
mon law principles as are still applied against monopolies-but
are primarily intended to take the place of corporate organiza-
tions in small businesses, and are being adopted because of the
existence of the greater convenience and flexibility (whether
actual or supposed) in the organization and management of
trusts as compared with corporations. It is this form of trust
which is the subject of this article.
In both popular and legal use these trusts are very generally
referred to as "Massachusetts trusts." This also is a purely
historical accident. The trust for business purposes grew up in
Massachusetts rather early and is even now better developed in
that commonwealth than in most other jurisdictions. The rea-
son is somewhat problematical although it has been suggested
that it was due to unusual restrictions upon the holding of real
estate in Massachusetts by corporations. 3. At any rate the
name "Magsachusetts trust" seems to be in favor, although per-
haps "common law trust" or better still "business trust" would
be more desirable. However "common law trusts" will not do
in Massachusetts itself or in Oklahoma or Wisconsin, for these
states have statutes regulating such organizations.4
2 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834
(1890) ; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Oh. St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892).
3 See S. R. Wrightington, "Voluntary Associations in Massachusetts,"
21 Yale Law Journal 311.
4 Massachusetts St. 1909, c. 441, as amended; St. 1914, c. 742; Gen.
Acts 1916, c. 184. Oklahoma, Chapter 16, Laws of 1919. Wisconsin, Chap-
ter 423, Laws of 1923.
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The Massachusetts trust may perhaps be defined simply as a
trust formed for the purpose of carrying on business. As such,
it is unquestionably a somewhat modern development although
testamentary trusts have been established for this purpose for
a very long time. 5 But the Massachusetts trust was more
directly an outgrowth of the line of development begun by Cox
v. Hickman,6 which held that a trust formed to carry on the
business of an insolvent partnership in the interest of its
creditors was itself valid and did not subject the trustees to
liability as partners. Then as a natural development came the
formation of trusts merely as machinery for securing the lenders
of money. Nearly all bond issues involve the creation of a
trust, the property being mortgaged to a trustee. Even more
clearly is this the case with respect to railroad car trusts. And
then came the trust for controlling and securing investments,
first the corporate voting trust and then the trust which actually
makes it its business to invest in securities and change invest-
ments as considered desirable-the purpose being primarily the
diversification of investments so as to lessen the risk of the
investors who take the position of cestuis of the trust. These
investment trusts have had an extraordinary development in
our large financial centers in the years since the war, but were
well known and quite extensively used before that time, espe-
cially in England. 7
From investment trusts, especially where the investments
were constantly subject to change and required the careful
attention of the trustees, to business trusts, is obviously a short
step. The line between investment and the carrying on of
business is often a very tenuous one, as has been shown fre-
quently in the case of corporations. The legality of the Massa-
chusetts trust per se seems therefore indisputable in theory. It
should be remembered, however, that such trusts may be used
for improper purposes and if so the trustee and other parties
interested may be subject to the same penalties as would apply
in any other case of violation of statutes or of rules of public
5 E. parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr. 111 (1804); In re Raybould (1900) 1
Ch. 199; Woddrop v. Weed, 154 Pa. 307, 26 Atl. 375 (1893).
6 8 H. L. C. 208 (1860). See also Re Stanton Iron Co., 27 Beav. 474
(1855), which involves the same organization. Wells-Stone Mercantile Co.
v. Glover, 7 N. D. 460, 75 N. W. 91 (1898), and In re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668
(1922) are American cases following the doctrine of Cox v. Hickman. See
also Sullivan v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 239 Ill. App. 1 (1925).
7 See Johnson v. Lewis, 6 Fed. 27 (1881), which involves an English
investment trust.
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policy. For example, a trust of this nature formed by a single
person for the carrying on of his own business is clearly void,
at least as respects the creditors of the person forming it. s In
Attorney-General v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rail-
way Co.,9 it was held that a railroad could not form a trust for
the purpose of evading a statute prohibiting it from holding
stock of its competitors (a suggestion of the renewal of trusts
for monopolistic purposes).10 A business trust has also been
held subject to the statutes providing for post office investiga-
tion." All of these holdings are obviously correct, for it would
be intolerable that this device should be used as a means of
evading statutory restrictions upon business or even judicial
rules of public policy.
MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS
It must be fairly obvious, however, that merely calling a busi-
ness organization a trust will not necessarily make it so. Such
an organization may conceivably be a partnership; also, accord-
ing to some courts at least, it may be a corporation. Obviously
these distinctions may be of very serious practical importance.
With respect to partnership, the distinction very largely de-
pends upon principles of agency. If the so-called trustees are
in fact the agents of the "cestuis" the latter must be considered
to be the principals and as such, to carry on the business as
partners. If the number of cestuis is large, the courts are in-
clined to regard them as a joint stock association, but of course
for most purposes a joint stock association is in legal effect a
partnership. 12
The test with respect to this matter is a dual one: First, how
much power have the trustees to act independently of the
cestuis, and secondly, to what extent are the cestuis associated
together? It would seem that the test of the control of the
cestuis over the trustees is the more important one, since unless
such control exists there must be in effect a trust even though
s Cunningham v. B?ight, 228 Mass. 385, 117 N. E. 909 (1917).
0 208 Mass. 497, 94 N. E. 808 (1911). But in Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed.
155 (1920) a trust formed merely to permit the liquidation of a corpora-
tion without subjecting the stockholders to income tax, was held valid.
10 See p. 595.
11 U. S. v. Invader Oil Corporation, 5 F. (2d) 715 (1925).
12 But see Haiku Sugar Co. v. Johnstone, 249 Fed. 103 (1918), where the
distinction between an association and an ordinary partnership is clearly
pointed out.
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the cestuis are associated. On the other hand, an association of
the cestuis is undoubtedly strong evidence of substantial control
by them of the activities of the trustee-since otherwise there
is no possible reason for such association. The test of associa-
tion is therefore chiefly important as evidence with respect to
the more fundamental test of control.
The tendency of the authorities, especially in Massachusetts
itself, has been to apply these tests with considerable rigidity-
that is to say, very slight control of the trustees' action by the
cestuis and very slight association of the cestuis has been
deemed sufficient ground to condemn the attempted trust as a
mere partnership. There are a number of cases to this effect in
Massachusetts, most of the earlier ones' 3 being summarized in
Williams v. Milton,'4 which is the leading case on the subject.
Here the trust in question was held to be a trust in fact and the
previous cases 1 were discussed and where necessary distin-
guished. The difference between the cases finding a partnership
and those where a true trust has been held to exist, was stated
to be "in the fact that in the former cases the certificate holders
are associated together by the terms of the 'trust' and are the
principals whose instructions are to be obeyed by their agent,
who for their convenience holds the legal title to their property,
the property is their property, they are the masters; while in
(a case of the true trust' 6), on the other hand there is no asso-
ciation between the certificate holders, the property is the prop-
erty of the trustees and the trustees are the masters." In the
trust in question in the case, the certificate holders (the certifi-
cates represent the beneficial interests) were in no way associ-
ated and there was no provision for meetings of certificate hold-
ers, although they could (acting individually) consent to action
for amendments or termination of the trust, which had been in-
itiated by the trustees. The trustees had full power to manage
the property and business, limited only by the specific terms of
the trust instrument, and the certificate holders had no interest
other than to receive their share of the profits. The court had
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that this was a true trust.
13 Hoadley v. County Commissioners, 105 Mass. 519 (1870) ; Whitman v.
Porter, 107 Mass. 522 (1871); Gleason v. McKay, 184 Mass. 419 (1883);
Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510 (1884); Ricker v. American Loan &
Trust Co., 140 Mass. 346, 5 N. E. 284 (1885); Mayo v. Moritz, 151 Mass.
481, 24 N. E. 1083 (1890); Williams v. Boston, 208 Mass. 497, 94 N. E.
808 (1911); Williams v. Johnson, 208 Mass. 544, 95 N. E. 90 (1911).
14 215 Mass. 1, 162 N. E. 355 (1913).
15 See note 13.
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It can hardly be contended that the Massachusetts cases have
been entirely consistent with respect of their application of this
test---for instance Willittms v. Milton17 itself overrules Williams
v. Johnson,18 where an attempted real estate trust had been held
to be a partnership although the trustee had sole power of man-
agement-but the general tendency has been to follow the test
laid down in Williams v. Milton. Thus in Frost v. Thompson'1
the trust was held to be in fact a partnership because of the
control over the trustees' action which the cestuis had the right
to exercise; but these powers of control were hardly broader
than those which stockholders of a corporation may exercise
with respect to directorate action. In the more recent case of
Baker v. The Commissioner,20 however, a trust instrument with
provisions that the majority of the certificate holders could
approve or disapprove the filling of vacancies in the trustees by
the trustees and that by three-fourths vote they could amend
the trust instrument itself were held insufficient to change the
trust into a partnership. But the Massachusetts rule is probably
still fairly represented by Williams v. Milton2l and it apparently
means that if the cestuis have power to elect trustees (including
the filling of vacancies in the board) to remove trustees or to
instruct the trustees in any matter whatever, there is danger
that the trust will be considered a mere partnership. It seems,
also, that any provision for meetings of certificate holders is
likewise dangerous, although the right of individual approval
or disapproval of fundamental changes in the organization of
the trust which have been proposed by the trustees, may be
given to the certificate holders.
It has often been urged that this test is too severe. The sug-
gestion is made that the certificate holders should have the same
power as stockholders in a corporation-that is to say that they
should at least have power to hold meetings for ratification or
disapproval of trustees' action and that they should have power
16 Mayo v. Moritz, supra, note 13, is the case taken.
17 Supra, note 14.
18 Supra, note 13.
19 219 Mass. 360, 106 N. E. 1009 (1914). Horgan v. Morgan, 233 Mass.
381, 124 N. E. 32 (1919) involves the same "trust." Howe v. Chmielski,
237 Mass. 532, 130 N. E. 56 (1921) and Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124,
136 N. E. 160 (1922) involve similar questions. See also Bouchard v.
First People's Trust, 253 Mass. 351, 148 N. E. 895 (1925).
20 253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593 (1925).
21 Supra, note 14.
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to elect and remove trustees or at least to fill vacancies in the
board arising through the death or removal of trustees.22 This
argument has considerable plausibility and has been accepted in
some of the cases. Conspicuous among these is Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland.23  Here the certificate holders
were given the right to remove trustees and appoint new trustees
to fill vacancies, and could also, by two-thirds vote, amend the
declaration of trust, or terminate the trust; and all this action
could be taken in shareholders meetings. The court, without
any detailed consideration of the point, held that this declaration
created a true trust, although it seems fairly clear that under
the Massachusetts view this would have been held to be a part-
nership. A similar case is Smith v. Anderson,24 where the
powers of the certificate holders were not quite so broad but
they did have power to fill vacancies in the trustees and approve
investments of the trust's funds. This organization was also
held to constitute a pure trust.
On the merits the correct result would seem to be somewhere
between the extreme positions previously summarized. The test
is, or should be, a practical one,25 but to say that the certificate
holders who are mere cestuis should be given the same power
as stockholders of a corporation seems subject to the obvious
objection that a trust is quite different from a corporation and
that the trustees must, in the nature of things, have greater
and more exclusive power than corporate directors. No doubt
there is a certain similarity in the offices, but the directors are
ultimately under the control of the stockholders by reason of the
fact that they are elected by them, whereas the cestuis of a
trust probably cannot thus control the trustees. The author is
inclined to agree, however, that to prevent the certificate-holders
taking such action as they may properly be given power to take,
in meetings, is carrying the requirement of non-association to a
ridiculous extreme. It would seem that association for doing
something which is far short of any control whatever of the
trustees is hardly sufficient to constitute a partnership.
22 See for a strong argument in favor of this view, Calvert Magruder,
"The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts," 23 Columbia Law Re-
view, 423.
23 39 R. I. 193, 98 Atl. 273 (1916).
24 15 Ch. D. 24 (1880). See also In re Siddall, 29 Ch. D. 1 (1885).
25 See I. P. Hildebrand, "The Massachusetts Trust," 1 Texas Law Re-
view, 127. It must be noticed, however, that the test is the power granted
to the certificate holders, not alone what they actually exercise.
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At any rate the decided weight of authority tends to follow
the rigid Massachusetts rule on this point.26 And the rule has
likewise been approved by the Federal Supreme Court.27 It is
apparent, therefore, that as a practical matter the certificate
holders should be given no power to fill vacancies in the trustees
or to remove trustees and that it is not very safe to have any
provision for meetings of the certificate holders. 28
On the other hand, as has been said,20 some courts have con-
tended that a Massachusetts trust, although avoiding the pitfalls
of partnership, in fact constitutes a corporation. This seems
an obviously fallacious theory, because it ignores the fact that
a trust may carry on business as well as a partnership,30 and
unsound in practice because it requires the difficult if not im-
possible determination of the line between investment and busi-
ness. 31 A trust, in the nature of things, cannot constitute an
entity, being merely a method by which certain individuals (the
trustees) hold property and carry on activities for the benefit of
the cestuis; whereas it is fundamental that a corporation is an
26Reilly v. Clyne, 23 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); Betts v. Hacka-
thorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W. 602 (1923); Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Ida.
360, 85 Pac. 1094 (1906); Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246
(1893); Mallory v. Russell, 71 Ia. 63, 32 N. W. 102 (1887); Hamilton v.
Young, 116 Kans. 128, 225 Pac. 1045; Rand v. Morse, 289, Fed. 839 (1923)
(Law of Missouri involved); Gordon Campbell Petroleum Co. v. Gordon
Campbell-Kevin Syndicate, 75 Mont. 261, 242 Pac. 540 (1926); Simson v.
Klipstein, 262 Fed. 823 (1920) (Law of New Jersey involved); Appeal of
Merchant's Fund. Association, 136 Pa. 43, 20 Atl. 527 (1890); Davis v.
Hudgkins, 225 S. W. 73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). In Home Lumber Co. v.
Hopkins, 107 Kans. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920) the share holders had the
power to hold meetings and elect the trustees, who, however, had the sole
power to conduct the business. The court held that this was a true trust,
but approved the doctrine of the Massachusetts cases and purported to
follow them.
27 Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223 (1919); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S.
144 (1924).
28 The contention has sometimes been made that the proper distinction
between a trust and a partnership is not one of control but rather of
powers; i. e., that a trust cannot carry on business, as distinguished from
investment. See W. W. Cook, "The Mysterious Massachusetts Trust," 9
American Bar Association Journal 763. This suggestion appears to be
without any support in principle or authority, and may be dismissed with-
out further comment.
29 See p. 598.
40 See note 28; also Bouchard v. First People's Trust, supra, note 19,
and Betts v. Hackathorn, supra, note 26, both of which are examples of
trusts carrying on active business.
31 See p. 597.
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entity. Most of the cases cited on this point relate to Blue Sky
Laws, a matter which will be considered hereafter.3 2 Here it
is sufficient to notice that the courts often rely upon a constitu-
tional provision which is usually wholly inapplicable to trusts
(because the constitutional provisions refer only to "associa-
tions") and is certainly by its terms inapplicable except for its
particular purposes.3 3  Accordingly, even if the court should
be right in saying that the trust is a corporation with respect
to the particular matters under consideration, it is certainly
unjustified in saying that it is a corporation for all purposes.
A very curious application of this corporation difficulty came
in the case of Superior Oil and Refining Syndicate, Limited v.
Handley.34 Here a Massachusetts trust, which was apparently
one in the strict sense and in no sense a partnership, carried on
the business of making brick and refining oil. This trust was
held to be a trust company and therefore within the Oregon
laws for regulating foreign banking corporations. It is rather
difficult to comment upon this except to say that one would have
thought it an impossible decision of any court or other human
instrumentality except one devised by the brilliant imagination
of a Lewis Carroll or a W. S. Gilbert. The trust company mak-
ing bricks and refining oil in solemn compliance with the Oregon
banking laws is certainly a conception which would have de-
lighted these masters of the grotesque.
It is therefore to be hoped that the corporation theory of
Massachusetts trusts will be done away with, as it has no excuse
for being. On the other hand the contention of many courts that
such a trust so called may very easily become a partnership is
entirely sound, even though their application of the distinction
may sometimes be subject to criticism.
LEGALITY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS
It would seem that the legality of such a business trust is
entirely clear and should be undisputed. Such, however, is not
the case, although the authorities are comparatively few which
32 See p. 614.
33 A typical provision of this sort is Art. 12, sec. & of the Kansas Con-
stitution, which was considered in Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, supra,
note 26. This provides in part that "The term 'corporations' as used in this
article, shall include all associations and joint-stock companies having
powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships." It
will be noted that this has no application to trusts, unless trusts are asso-
ciations; and, of course, they are not.
34 99 Ore. 146, 195 Pac. 159 (1921).
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squarely decide that the Massachusetts trust is, by its nature,
illegal. But such authorities as decide that a Massachusetts
trust is invariably a corporation or a partnership obviously
result in effect in denying legality to such a trust, since they
deny its only reason for existence. Similarly there are a num-
ber of statements unfavorable to the validity of such trusts in
connection with state Blue Sky Laws and laws regulating the
status of foreign corporations. Conceding that all these are
mere dicta, yet they often represent the law of the state on the
point or at least the only available evidence of that law. On
the other hand, a number of courts which have said and even
decided that a Massachusetts trust is illegal in the state have
yet recognized its existence in case of a controversy in which
the state was not concerned. 35 It follows that an attempt to
determine the validity of the Massachusetts trust in the various
states is perhaps necessarily unsatisfactory. However, so far
as can be determined, the situation is as follows:
The Massachusetts trust is legal not only in Massachusetts,
Oklahoma 30 and WisconsinA7 which have statutes regulating it,
but in Arizona,3 8 Arkansas, 3 9 California, 40 Colorado, 4 1 Idaho,42
Illinois, 43 Maryland, 44 Missouri, 45 Montana, 4 6 New Jersey,4 7 New
35 See for example the Washington cases cited in note 60 below.
30 See Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561
(1924).
37 See Baker v. Stern, 216 N. W. 147.
38 Reilly v. Kline, supra, note 26.
39 Betts v. Hackathorn, supra, note 26. But see Baker-McGrew Co. v.
Union Seed & Fertilizer Co., 125 Ark. 146, 188 S. W. 571 (1916).
40 Ex parte" Girard, 186 Cal. 718, 200 Pac. 593 (1921).
41 Wimer & Co. v. Downs, 77 Colo. 377, 237 Pac. 155 (1925). here
the question was as to the right to compel transfers, and the validity of
the trust was rather assumed than discussed.
42 See Spotswood v. Morris, supra, note 26.
43 Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246 (1893) ; H. Kramer & Co.
v. Cummings, 225 Ill. App. 26 (1922). But see Guthmann v. Adco Dry Stor-
age Battery Co., 232 Ill. App. 327 (1924). Any question as to the legality of
business trusts in Illinois would seem to be settled by the recent decision
of the Supreme Court in Schumann-Heink v. Folson, 159 N. E. 250 (1927).
44 Warburton v. Perkins, 150 Md. 304, 133 Atl. 141 (1926).
45 State v. Lee, 288 Mo. 679, 233 S. W. 20 (1921). This case holds
that a business trust is not a corporation, notwithstanding a provision in
the state constitution similar to that of Kansas, set forth in note 33, supra.
See also Rand v. Morse, supra, note 26.
46 Gordon Ca'mpbell Petroleum Co. v. Gordon Campbell-Kevin Syndicate,
supra, note 26.
47 Simson v. Klipstein, 88 N. J. Eq. 229, 102 Atl. 242 (1917). A case
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York,48 North Dakota,49 Pennsylvania, 50 Rhode Island, 51 and
West Virginia ;52 also in England. On the other hand it is appar-
ently invalid in Florida, 54 Indiana,55 Kansas, 56 Michigan,57
Oregon, 5 Texas,59 and Washington. 0 The comments which
in the Federal courts of the same name and involving the same trust is
reported in 262 Fed. 823 (1920), supra, note 26.
4 8 Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922).
49 Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Glover, supra, note 6.
50 Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 Atl. 309 (1905).
51 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, sup'a, note 23.
52 See Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 W. Va. 517, 125 S. E. 230 (1924)
where the court adopted the Massachusetts test with apparent approval;
but the case is not really a square decision on the point, since the trust
in question was formed in Massachusetts, and the court considered itself
bound by the Massachusetts law.
53 Smith v. Anderson, supra, note 24.
54 Willey v. W. J. Hodgson Corporation, 90 Fla. 343, 106 So. 408 (1925).
55 McLaren v. Dawes Sign & Mfg. Co., 156 N. E. 584 (Appellate Court).
See discussion of this case in 3 Indiana Law Journal 318.
56 Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, supra, note 26. The court held that
a Massachusetts trust could not carry on business in the state, but, on
rehearing, concluded that it might sell its securities, upon complying with
the local Blue Sky Law. The logic of this conclusion is rather difficult to
see, since if the trust is illegal, it would seem hardly proper to permit its
securities to be sold.
57 Hemphill v. Orloff, 238 Mich. 508, 213 N. W. 867 (1927). But in
Forgan v. Mackie, 232 Mich. 476, 205 N. W. 600 (1925) it was held that
a trust formed in Massachusetts could sue in Michigan by its assumed
name.
58 Superior Oil & Refining Syndicate, Limited, v. Handley, supra,
note 34.
59 The Texas cases on this point are numerous and irreconcilable. Pre-
sumably the point was settled by the decision of the state Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S. W. 554 (1925), which holds that a Massa-
chusetts trust is invariably a partnership in Texas and overrules Connally
v. Lyons, 82 Tex. 664, 18 S. W. 799 (1891). The reasoning of the court
is hopelessly bad, especially in the total misunderstanding of the elementary
principles of the law of agency. Still it might be supposed to settle the
law of the state. But the Commission of Appeals, in Shelton v. Montoya
Oil & Gas Co., 292 S. W. 165 (1927), in effect refused to follow Thompson
v. Schmitt, so that the very wealth of authority in Texas seems to leave
the exact state of the law in greater uncertainty. For other typical cases
on both sides of the question see Davis v. Hudgkins, 225 S. W. 73 (1920);
Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co., 239 S. W. 1001 (1922); McCamey
v. Hollister Oil Co., 241 S. W. 689 (1922), affirmed in 274 S. W. 562
(1925); Morehead v. Greenville Exchange National Bank, 243 S. W. 546
(1922); Phoenix Oil Co. v. McLaren, 244 S. W. 830 (1922); Hardee v.
Adams Oil Association, 254 S. W. 602 (1923); Graham v. Omar Gasoline
Co., 253 S. W. 896 (1923); Cattle Raisers' Loan Co. v. Sutton, 271 S. W.
233 (1925); Continental Supply Co. v. Adams, 272 S. W. 325 (1925);
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have been made as to the unsatisfactory nature of the existing
judicial pronouncements apply in great force to several of the
states listed above as making the Massachusetts trust invalid
and it is hoped that they will eventually reach an opposite con-
clusion when the question is more squarely presented. It is
also to be noted that practically every state confines certain
sorts of businesses to corporations. This is very frequent in
the case of railway and public utility activities and may also be
extended to banking and insurance. 61 In these cases, of course,
a Massachusetts trust cannot carry on such business but this
cannot properly be considered a discrimination against these
trusts, since individuals are likewise precluded from such
activities.
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES AND THE RULE AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON
ALIENATION, TO MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS
It has often been considered or at least feared by persons con-
nected with or advising these trusts, that they may violate the
rule against perpetuities. Accordingly, it is quite general to
provide for their termination within the period defined by the
rule or by the statutes of the state. The persons whose lives
are used are often children of persons active in the trust, in
Wineinger v. Farmers', etc., Association, 278 S. W. 932 (1926); Feldman
v. Seay, 291 S. W. 350 (1927); Stephenson v. Kirkham, 297 S. W. 265
(1927). The Texas cases are ably criticized by Scott Rowley in "The In-
fluence of Control in the Determination of Partnership Liability," 26 Michi-
gan Law Review, 290 (January, 1928).
6o People ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923);
State v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926). But other cases recog-
nize the existence, if not the legality, of business trusts, in Washington.
Thus in Jesseph v. Carroll, 126 Wash. 661, 219 Pac. 429 (1923) a mortgage
made by such a trust was enforced, and in Lowman v. Guie, 130 Wash. 606,
228 Pac. 845 (1924) the trust was protected as a purchaser of machinery
not subject to an unrecorded chattel mortgage. The trustees of a business
trust may sue to protect the trust property. Denny v. Cascade Platinum
Co., 133 Wash. 436, 232 Pac. 409 (1925); Elsom v. Teift, 140 Wash. 586,
250 Pac. 346 (1926). Both of the cases last cited insist that a business
trust is not an "entity"--a position which is obviously correct but shows
the unsoundness of the court's own theory that such trusts are analagous
to corporations or associations. It is also held that the existence and
validity of business trusts are not subject to collateral attack, but only
to direct attack by the state. Haynes v. Central Business Property Co., 140
Wash. 596, 249 Pac. 1057 (1926).
61 See for examples, Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes (1926), Sec.
8877 (insurance) and Sec. 12858 (railroads).
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order that the period may be as long as possible. Probably such
a provision is desirable, as a matter of precaution. But it is
submitted that the rule against perpetuities has no relation
whatever to a Hassachusetts trust-as indeed it has not to any
other trust. The rule is, by its very definition, concerned
with non-vested interests only. The interest of a holder of a
certificate of beneficial interest is clearly vested. It is to be sure
a limited and equitable interest but it is as fully vested as a legal
fee simple. 2 Fortunately this point seems-to have given the
courts little trouble.63
The same applies to the rule against restraints on alienation.
The intention, at least, is to make the certificates as nearly nego-
tiable instruments as shares of stock of corporations. While
stock certificates are not strictly negotiable instruments, no one
has ever doubted their transferability. It might be urged that
these certificates of beneficial interest in a trust ordinarily rep-
resent real estate and that might create some difficulties in
transferring them. This matter will be discussed more fully in
connection with the subject of taxation. It is sufficient to say
here, first, that such certificates are ordinarily transferable only
by written indorsement (which satisfies the Statute of Frauds)
and secondly that the real property of the trust is generally
converted by agreement into personal property. In any case,
beneficial interests, while limited, are as fully transferable as
any interests whatever. It is also quite usual to provide that
the trustees shall have power to convey the trust property; but
it seems clear that they have this power, anyway, unless spe-
cifically restricted. 4
THE TAX LIABILITY OF MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS, AND
OF THE PERSONS INTERESTED IN THEM
It is obvious that a Massachusetts trust (which is a real
trust) cannot be subjected to taxes imposed on a partnership or
upon partners.15 On the other hand there has been some attempt
to impose corporation taxes upon these organizations. This
seems a manifest absurdity until it is understood that joint stock
62 See S. R. Wrightington "Unincorporated Associations," pp. 28 ff.
63 Howe v. Morse, 174 Mlass. 491, 55 N. E. 213 (1899) ; Baker v. Stern,
supra, note. 37.
64 Baker v. Sterm, supra, note 37, also considers the rule against re-
straints on alienation and correctly decides that it has no reference to the
beneficial interests in trusts.
65 Williams v. Milton, supra, note 14.
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associations and similar organizations, while technically part-
nerships, are frequently treated as corporations, for tax pur-
poses. This has been the rule of the federal government with
respect to income taxes from the beginning; and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has reached the same conclusion
with respect to the power of the legislature to tax such unin-
corporated organizations. 6 Indeed a number of cases in which
the nature of the organization-that is whether joint stock
association and therefore partnership, or true trust-was deter-
mined, were tax cases. 67
The test with respect to income tax liability is very similar,
as has already been pointed out. In the federal law it is spe-
cifically provided that "The term 'corporation' includes associa-
tions, joint stock companies, and insurance companies" 68 and
of course that such "corporations" are themselves subject to
income tax. The same was true with respect to the excess profits
tax imposed under the Revenue Acts of 1917, 1918, and 1921.
On the other hand, it is obvious that a true trust is not an entity
and cannot be subjected to income or other taxes as such. This
does not mean of course that income from trust property is non-
taxable nor would it perhaps be impossible to impose an excise
tax upon merely acting in a trust capacity. But it is clear that
all such taxes must be imposed upon individuals or other tax-
able entities-the trustees or the cestuis, or both-but cannot
be imposed upon the trust itself. This is not a mere technical
distinction, for while under the Federal Revenue Act, a tax is of
course imposed upon income from trust property, the tax is at
the regular rates of taxes upon individuals even when, as a
matter of procedure, it is collected from the trustees. This is
the usual procedure but it is provided that in the case of trust
income which may in the discretion of the fiduciary be dis-
tributed to the beneficiaries the amount actually so distributed
need not be accounted for by the trustees but constitutes part
of the taxable income of the beneficiaries.0 9 This provision would
apply to the trusts under consideration so that with respect to
actual distributions during the year no tax would be imposed
upon the trust or trustees, but the tax would be paid by the
66 Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603, 85 N. E. 545 (1908). See also
Ricker v. American Loan & Trust Co., 140 Mass. 346, 5 N. E. 284 (1885).
67 For example, Williams v. Milton, supra, note 14.
08 Sec. 2 of the Revenue Act of 1926. This 1926 Act will be referred to
hereafter in connection with Federal taxation unless specifically otherwise
provided.
69 Sec. 219, especially subdivision (b) (2).
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beneficiaries exactly as if the trust did not exist. It may be
added that the tax authorities have tended to look with great
hostility upon trusts formed by one individual or by a small
group of wealthy individuals with the hope of so manipulating
their income as to escape tax thereon; and such feeling is
hardly unnatural.70 But this can hardly apply to the average
Massachusetts trust where the number of beneficiaries is so
large as to preclude any effective jockeying of the income be-
tween the trust and themselves.
The above represents what is clearly the situation under the
Federal Income Tax Law and indeed, as already shown, it is
impossible, in the nature of things, to impose an income tax
upon a trust as such. The United States Supreme Court adopted
this view in Crocker v. Malley,71 where the court having reached
the conclusion that the trust there in question was a true trust
within the test of the Massachusetts cases, found no difficulty
in holding that it was not subject to income tax. The more
recent case of Burke-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins72 is
not in any respect contrary, for here the alleged trust was found
to constitute a partnership. It is probable that this conclusion
was correct even under the Massachusetts view because of the
large measure of control which the certificate holders had. At
any rate, the court considered that it was bound by the law of
Texas, where the trust was organized, which, as already indi-
cated, would seem to hold that all business trusts are partner-
ships.
The same rule would apply to excise taxes, at least in the
absence of a special excise tax imposed upon individuals doing
business in a trust form. Even then the tax could not be im-
posed upon the trust itself, and as a matter of fact no such tax is
imposed. Indeed, the early cases under the corporation excise
tax act of 1909 held that even partnership associations could not
be subjected to tax, by reason of the fact that they were not
organized in pursuance of a statute.73 But the well known case
of Heeht v. Malley74 was deemed to throw considerable doubt
70 Cf., however, Weeks v. Sibley, supra, note 9.
71 Supra, note 27.
72 269 U. S. 110 (1925). Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 275
Fed. 60 (1921) is a similar case.
73 Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911); Eliot v. Freeman,
220 U. S. 178 (1911). But in Robertson v. Anderson, 226 Fed. 7 (1915)
a New York joint-stock association was held subject to the tax, because
it was organized under, and given special powers by, a state statute,
although the liability of the members was unlimited.
74Supra, note 27.
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upon the proposition that Massachusetts trusts are not subject
to excise taxes. Indeed this case has been claimed to overrule
Ci-ocker v. Malley,75 although the court itself indicates that its
conclusion might well be different with respect to income taxes7 6
The Hecht case involved the question as to the liability to the
federal excise tax (called the "Capital Stock Tax" because based
upon the fair value of the capital stock) imposed by the Revenue
Acts of 1916 to 1924. This tax was imposed upon corporations,
associations, etc., "with respect to carrying on or doing busi-
ness" and of course did not apply even to corporations in the
strict sense, which did not carry on business.77 Obviously, how-
ever, this restriction does not apply to Massachusetts trusts, for
they certainly do carry on business. The only question is
whether they are associations, and so taxable entities. The case
involved three such trusts, one of which had been reorganized
as an association. The court concluded that all three were
associations and so taxable under the 1918 act though not tax-
able under the 1916 act because in the court's opinion the 1916
act had carried over the same restrictions as the 1909 act-that
only associations organized in pursuance of a statute should be
taxable. The 1918 act had no such restriction.
So far, no criticism can be made of the decision of the court
and the contention that it overruled Crocker v. Malley is an
obvious absurdity, 7S in view of the fact that all of the so-called
trusts in the Hecht case were, in the opinion of the court, tax-
able entities. It must be conceded however that the court did
add by way of dictum certain language which does throw real
doubt upon Crocker v. Malley and the view as to the non-liability
of Massachusetts trusts to tax, hereinbefore expressed. There
is more or less language that a Massachusetts trust is subject
to excise tax because it carries on business in a similar manner
and with similar immunities to the persons concerned, as a corpo-
ration. Such language is most unfortunate in that it has given
rise to a misconception of what the case actually decided. It is
confidently hoped that when the question again comes before
the court, it will recognize that such language is pure dictum
and that Hecht v. Malley does not and could not properly decide
Vi Supra, note 27.
70 The contention that Hecht v. Malley overrules Crocker v. Malley is
made in State v. Paine, supra, note 60.
.7 See cases cited in note 73, supra.
7.h This is clearly shown by the decision in Hornblower v. White, 21 F.
(2d) 82 (1927).
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that a Massachusetts trust (which is a true trust) can be sub-
jected to an excise or other tax.
The rule with respect to stock issue taxes must be essentially
the same. This is not solely because the interest of a certificate
holder of a trust is not stock-this is perhaps a purely technical
distinction-but because such a tax is imposed upon the issuing
organization, and a trust as such is not taxable. The single
authority is in accord with this contention.79 On the other
hand it might well be contended that a transfer of certificates
of beneficial interests in a trust might be taxed because this
would be a tax which would ultimately fall upon individuals;
but no such tax is imposed at present.
The question still remains as to property and inheritance
taxes. Neither can be imposed upon a trust as such, but so far
as property taxes are concerned, the practical difficulty is not
very great, because the tax may be (and generally is) imposed
upon the trustees and so is paid out of the corpus of the trust.
It would appear that to impose a tax upon the cestuis with
respect to their beneficial interests in the trust would constitute
double taxation. But where the property is outside the state or
where the certificate holder is a non-resident there is no prob-
lem of double taxation, so far as a single jurisdiction is con-
cerned, at least, and the question of the nature of the certificate
holder's interest becomes vital. At the same time if the certifi-
cates represent real property their transfer may involve serious
legal difficulties. The undoubted economic similarity between
such trust certificates and corporate stock certificates breaks
down at this point.
It seems fairly obvious that beneficial interests in a trust
which holds real estate outside of the jurisdiction are not sub-
ject to tax in the jurisdiction in the absence of some provision
in the trust instrument showing an intent for the equitable
conversion of the realty into personal propertyso But such a
provision is quite common in the declarations used for business
trusts. Indeed it is often provided specifically that the shares
are to be regarded as personal property. Under these circum-
stances the transferability of the certificate seems clear, but the
liability of the interests representd by the certificate to taxation
as personal property at the domicile of the holder seems like-
wise unescapable81
79 Hornblower v. White, supra, note 78.
80 Green County v. Smith, 148 Ark. 33, 228 S. W. 730 (1921).
81 See Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174, 31 N. E. 907 (1892). The
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The matter has been elaborately considered by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in two cases, Dana v. Treasurer
and Receiver General2 and Priestly v. Burrill.83 In the Dana
case there were three so-called trusts, but two of them were de-
termined by the court to constitute partnerships. All three
owned real property outside Massachusetts. The question arose
as to the liability to inheritance tax of beneficial interests in
these trusts owned by a resident decedent (the question as to
liability to property tax, although not litigated, would seem to
be the same). The court held that the interests in the first two
so-called trusts (but actually partnerships) were taxable. The
decedent's interest was that of a partner and while in Massa-
chusetts (as in most American jurisdictions) the mere fact of
partnership does not of itself constitute a sufficient reason for
deteimining that the property has been converted, yet the court
considered that the provisions in the agreement for future con-
version and for the present transferability of shares showed
that a conversion was intended. It may be questioned whether
these provisions were necessarily sufficient to prove an intent to
convert, but certainly no very great evidence of such intent is
necessary in the case of a partner. With respect to the final
trust, which the court held really was a trust, the court reached
the conclusion that the beneficial interest was non-taxable. There
was no provision for conversion here and the court held that a
mere provision that the certificates of beneficial interest should
be transferable was not sufficient to show an equitable con-
version, since a writing would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It
would appear from this that a bearer certificate of interest in a
Massachusetts trust would have to be treated as personal prop-
erty because it is transferable without writing and so if it rep-
resents real property it violates the Statute of Frauds. Further-
more what is to be said of statutes which require that a con-
veyance of real property be under seal? It might be answered
that such statutes do not refer to equitable interests since equity
contrary decision of Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476 (1915) seems unsus-
tainable, and is, in fact, disapproved in the Massachusetts cases, hereafter
discussed. In Kennedy v. Hodges, 215 Mass. 112, 102 N. E. 432 (1913)
the court said with respect to the transferability of certificates in a busi-
ness trust "There is on principle in this respect no distinction between
such certificate and a certificate for shares of stock in a domestic corpo-
ration."
82 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941 (1917).
83230 Mass. 452, 120 N. E. 100 (1918).
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will supply this defect in an otherwise proper conveyance.8 4 It
is submitted that in the normal case and even without an express
provision in the Declaration of Trust to this effect the certifi-
cates of interest in a Massachusetts trust holding real property
must be deemed to represent personal property, since they are
obviously intended to be transferable as freely as corporate
stock certificates and if they represent real property the transfer
is certainly more difficult, and its validity more doubtful.
P-iestly v. Burrillk'3 is to some extent a converse case. Here
the intestate was a non-resident of Massachusetts but owned
interests in several so-called trusts holding real property in that
commonwealth. In the first of these trusts there was a specific
direction in the trust agreement that the trustees should con-
vert the real property into personalty. The court held therefore
that the interests of the intestate in these two trusts constituted
personalty and was non-taxable in Massachusetts. It may be
noted that the court does not make it clear as to whether, in its
opinion, these two trusts were actually trusts or not, and indeed
intimates that under the circumstances this would be immaterial.
As to the third so-called trust, it was held to be in fact a part-
nership, and there being no requirement for conversion, the in-
testate, though a partner, was held the owner of an interest in
real property in Massachusetts, and an inheritance tax imposed.
This case certainly does not tend to change the conclusion
tentatively drawn from the previous case, at least with respect to
the normal situation. The certificates of interest in a Massachu-
setts trust are freely transferable, with no greater formality
than is required in the case of corporate stock certificates;
but for that very reason, such certificates represent and consti-
tute personal property and are subject to tax at the domicile of
the owner, even though some or all of the property of the trust
consists of real estate outside of the state of domicile. To make
the certificate transferable as freely as corporate stock certifi-
cates it is generally necessary to consider that this real estate
is converted into personal property.86
84 See Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 70.
85 See note 83, supra.
86 However, in Baker v. Commissioner of Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148
N. E. 593 (1925) it was held that the certificates represented an equitable
interest in real property. The case is perhaps reconcilable with the view
herein expressed, because the express provision in the Declaration of Trust
for future conversion might reasonably be considered to exclude a present
conversion.
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LIABILITY TO STATE BLUE SKY LAWS
That Massachusetts trusts should be subject to the so-called
Blue Sky Laws of the states where they respectively operate,
seems fairly obvious. Whether such laws perform any useful
function is to say the least somewhat questionable, but that their
scope comprehends the business trust is entirely clear. The
Massachusetts trust carries on active business and, what is
more to the purpose with respect to Blue Sky Laws, it generally
attempts to distribute its securities somewhat widely. Under
these circumstances although the trust is not a corporation or
an association, it would clearly be a serious defect in the applica-
tion of the Blue Sky Laws if they did not include such trusts
which constitute an increasingly popular method of doing busi-
ness and selling securities. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
to find that the authorities are unanimously to the effect that
business trusts must comply with the Blue Sky Laws of the state
in order to be permitted to distribute their securities within the
state.81 In some states, as in California,8s this result is entirely
clear, since the Blue Sky Law specifically includes individuals
as well as corporations and associations. Undoubtedly this is
the most desirable form of such a statute. But states where the
statute is more restricted in its application have by some method
of construction managed to stretch the statutory language so
as to make it cover the Massachusetts trust.80 In some cases
as in Kansas 9o this necessitates treating the trust, as an associa-
tion, which is clearly wrong, but perhaps does not work so badly
for this particular purpose. It would appear that the holdings
87 The leading case is Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, supra, note 26. See
also Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kans. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926). That
the solution of this question depends largely upon the policy of the Blue
Sky Laws is clearly shown in State v. Cosgrove, 36 Ida. 278, 210 Pac. 393
(1922). See also for a general discussion (from the standpoint of a gov-
ernment official) L. S. Duxbury "Business Trusts and State Blue Sky
Laws," 8 Minnesota Law Review, 465.
8s Ex parte Girard, supra, note 40; Agnew v. Daugherty, 189 Cal. 446,
209 Pac. 34 (1922).
S9 Reilly v. Cline, supra, note 26; Coleman v. McKee, 162 Ark. 90, 257
S. W. 733 (1924) (holding that securities of a Texas trust may be sold
in Arkansas, upon complying with the statutory formalities, since, what-
ever their validity in Texas, they were valid in Arkansas); King v. Com-
monwealth, 197 Ky. 128, 246 S. W. 162 (1922); Wagner v. Kelso, 195 Ia.
959, 193 N. W. 1 (1923); People v. Clum, 213 Mich. 651, 182 N. W. 136
(1921); State v. Summerland, 150 Minn. 266, 185 N. W. 255 (1921);
Schmidt v. Stortz, 208 Mo. App. 439, 236 S. W. 694 (1922).
90 See Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, supra, note 26.
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of the courts on this point are substantially sound although they
are sometimes based upon a rather unjustified stretching of
the statutory language, which has its unfortunate effect in other
connections, as has already been seen. But the net result is that
the Massachusetts trusts are subject to the state Blue Sky Laws
and it is rather hard for the most enthusiastic defender of these
trusts and especially of their freedom from undue governmental
interference, to deny that such holdings are justified.
POWER OF THE STATE TO EXCLUDE MASSACHUSETTS
TRUSTS FROM DOING BUSINESS
This topic is obviously closely related to that of the Blue Sky
Laws. It would seem that if the states can subject these trusts
to their Blue Sky Laws, they could likewise exclude such trusts
if they failed to comply therewith; and indeed this is indis-
putable. 91 However, the broad question remains as to the right
of the states to exclude Massachusetts trusts altogether. Here
again it would seem entirely proper, as a matter of policy, that
the states should have this power; and so it has been held. The
leading case is Hemphill v. Orloff,92 but it is submitted that the
reasoning of the case is hardly satisfactory. It proceeds upon
the assumption, which is entirely unjustifiable, that in fact the
Massachusetts trust is a corporation or at least an association
and is therefore without inherent right to carry on business in
the state. Upon this assumption the argument of the court pro-
ceeds easily to the result desired.
But the reasoning of the court amounts to nothing more than
the setting up of a man of straw-to wit the alleged claim of
corporate immunity from state regulation-and knocking it
over. The decision leaves untouched the very serious constitu-
tional question which arises because of the actual nature of the
Massachusetts trust. Not only does the federal constitution
prevent a state from barring an individual from doing business
within its borders 93 but it has likewise been held that a state
statute prohibiting a non-resident from acting as trustee of
property within the state denied such person his constitutional
91 See cases cited in notes 87 to 89, supra.
92 Supra, note 57. See discussion of this case in 41 Harvard Law Re-
view, 86. The Washington rule is likewise to the effect that a Massachu-
setts trust may be excluded from the state. People ex rel. Range v. Hinkle,
supra, note 60; State v. Paine, idem (but see Haynes v. Central Business
Property Co., idem).
93 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1919).
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rights.94 By combining these two doctrines, the argument that
a Massachusetts trust cannot be excluded by a state, can be made
very strong. Such a trust is simply individuals holding property
in trust and carrying on business within the state; it is in no
sense a corporation or association.95 Therefore it may well be
asked by what possible means the state can claim authority to
exclude it?
But this argument proves rather too much. If it is sound,
it must follow that the state has no regulatory power whatso-
ever and that even Blue Sky Laws do not apply to such trusts.
Such a situation would obviously be intolerable and would lead
to the speedy suppression of all such trusts. It has also been
suggested that a state may declare such trusts to be contrary
to its policy and thus prohibit them from any activity in the
state or restrict their activities upon any desired terms. 90 This
argument is probably sound although it too may be considered
to prove too much, for if a business trust is contrary to the
policy of the state then all trusts (or at least all trusts where
the trustees have any power whatever to carry on business
activities) must likewise be considered as contrary to the policy
of the atate. And no state would adopt such a far reaching policy
as this. 9 7
But the demand of policy that business organizations of any
substantial size and capitalization and particularly those having
numerous and widely-distributed share holders, should be under
state supervision seems to compel an affirmative answer to the
question as to the state's power to exclude Massachusetts trusts.
As already indicated, the constitutional question is still open 98
and on pure logic a very strong argument can be made in favor
of the entire freedom from interference of such trusts. It is
believed, however, that when the question is squarely presented
to the Federal Courts, they will reach the conclusion that the
94 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 27 Fed. 146,
and Shirk v. LaFayette, 52 Fed. 857, both holding unconstitutional an In-
diana statute providing that only citizens of the state could act as trustees
for holding real estate within Indiana. The doctrine of these cases was
accepted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342,
30 N. E. 1093 (1892).
95 Reilly v. Cline, supra, note 26, is also in error on this point.
96'See 41 Harvard Law Review 86 (supra, note 92.)
97 Testamentary trusts are legal everywhere, and that they carry on
business is immaterial. See p. 597.
98 An attempt to raise the point in connection with the Washington doc-
trine proved abortive. Taylor v. Dunbar, 298 Fed. 936 (1924).
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power of the Massachusetts trusts to carry on business within
the states and the terms on which such business is to be con-
ducted are and should be within the power of the states, so long
as no improper discriminations, of a nature which would in-
validate corporation restrictions, are imposed.
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The question of the liability of a business trust to be
adjudicated a bankrupt has arisen in a number of cases. Of
course if it constitutes a partnership it is clearly within section
23 of the Act,99 but, as already shown, a true Massachusetts
trust is not a partnership. Indeed the comparatively early case
of In re Associated Trust,0 0 in discussing this question reaches
the conclusion that while the organization in question was not
a true trust neither was it a partnership. The court then
reached the somewhat surprising result that a business trust
is an "unincorporated company" within Sec. 22 of the Act.
From this decision nearly all the authority on the point seems
to have descended. There are therefore a considerable number
of decisions laying down broadly the proposition that a Massa-
chusetts trust is subject to be adjudicated a bankrupt, as an
unincorporated company.' 0 ' Some of the decisions plainly re-
late to an organization which 'was a trust only in name, 0 2 but
others deal with what are apparently trusts in the strict sense.
Logically, this result is an absurdity. A Massachusetts trust
is certainly unincorporated, but it most decidedly is not a "com-
pany", a term which at least denotes an association, if not a
legal entity. Nevertheless the result is not so seriously
objectionable from the practical standpoint, nor is it perhaps
so far from the intent of the framers of the bankruptcy act.
It seems fairly clear that this intent was to cover any bus-
iness organization treated by common consent and from the
economic standpoint as a unit. This might perhaps have been
fully accomplished by a provision for individuals, corporations
99 Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F. (2d) 171 (1925).
100 222 Fed. 1012 (1914).
10l In re Sargent Lumber Co., 287 Fed. 154 (1923) ; Krey Packing Co.
v. Wildwood Springs Resort Association, 4 F. (2d) 793 (1925). See also
In re Order of Sparta, 242 Fed. 235 (1917) and In re Tidewater Coal
Exchange, 280 Fed. 638 (1922). Contra, In re Parker, 283 Fed. 404 (1921)
reversing 275 Fed. 868.
102 E. g. In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, spra, note 101.
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and partnerships, since the latter term includes, or may include,
joint stock associations and similar organizations;103 but to
make assurance doubly sure, the provision for unincorporated
companies was added. The action of a court in disregarding
the primary meaning of words in a statute, merely because the
statutory language does not cover a situation not foreseen by
the legislature, upon the theory that the legislature would have
provided for it if it had foreseen it, is of course not generally
to be commended; and it is clear likewise that most of the cases
on this point are a mere restatement of the ill-considered dicta,
in In Re Associated Trust. 04 Nevertheless the result is more
objectionable from a theoretical than from a practical stand-
point and it is improbable that the federal courts will now
change the thus far practically unanimous rule on this point,
that a Massachusetts trust may be adjudicated bankrupt.
LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY OF PERSONS CON-
NECTED WITH MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS
The primary purpose of the formation of a business trust is
to obtain the limitation of liability of the persons connected with
it-both trustees and cestuis-without the formation of a cor-
poration. The legal *aspects of this matter have already been
fully discussed in a comment in this publication,l10 so that an
extended discussion of this point seems now unnecessary. To
summarize the situation, it seems clear that if the legality of a
Massachusetts trust is recognized at all, the contractual liability
of the cestuis, being purely secondary, can be limited or entirely
abrogated by a provision in the contract or in the trust instru-
ment. Courts which deny this must thereby deny the entire
legality of a Massachusetts trust. Since the trustees are pri-
marily liable it is not possible to impose a limit upon their
liability except by a specific provision to that effect in the con-
tract or trust agreement, which provision must be brought to the
notice of the creditor who is claimed to be bound thereby. Some
courts deny that such a provision is legal but the distinct weight
of authority and reason is to the effect that the contractual lia-
103 See p. 608.
104 Supra, note 100.
105 3 Indiana Law Journal 318. Since the publication of this comment,
the matter has been exhaustively considered by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, supra, note 43, and the conclusions set forth
in the comment and in this article are fully supported by that decision.
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bility of the trustees may thus be limited, since the creditor has
recourse to the trust fund.
As to tort liability, it seems clear that the trustees cannot
be absolved from personal responsibility, although they are of
course entitled to indemnity from the trust fund except for
torts for which they were personally to blame. The cestuis are
generally held not be liable for torts of the trustees in which
they do not personally participate, at least where the trustees
have not a claim for indemnity against the trust. Indubitably
this may impose a hardship upon the tort creditor, and it has
been forcibly urged that such liability should be imposed upon
the cestuis irrespective of the financial relations between the
trustee and the cestuis.106
In the comment above referred to, it was also pointed out that
limitations of contractual liability were possible to some degree
even in the case of partnerships and that there was much to be
said for enforcing a provision for such limited liability against
a creditor of an organization purporting to be a trust but later
determined by the court to constitute a partnership association
because of the control exercised by the so-called cestuis upon the
trustees. This is a matter outside the scope of this article,
which is intended to deal with the Massachusetts trust in the
strict sense of that term. It is appropriate, however, to notice
a further objection which has been made by certain courts to
the recognition of Massachusetts trusts, particularly with re-
spect to clauses limting liability of the cestuis and the trustees.
This objection is that such trusts violate the policy of the limited
partnership statutes which, these courts contend, represent the
only legal method, outside of incorporating, for securing limited
liability. 107
This argument is perhaps sufficiently answered by the New
York case of Crehan v. Megarge.10 8 This case is especially in-
teresting as having arisen in the state where limited partner-
ships were first authorized in this country and where they have
had the fullest development. Here a trust was formed for the
purpose of raising funds to be used by the trustee as his con-
tribution to the capital of a limited partnership, of which he
was the special partner. The usual provisions were made for
106 See A. W. Scott, "Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of
Trusts," 28 Harvard Law Review 725, and H. F. Stone, "Theory of Lia-
bility of Trust Estates," 22 Columbia Law Review 527.
107 See cases cited in note 92, especially Hemphill v. Orloff.
108 Supra, note 48.
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the conduct of the trust, the only rights of the cestuis being to
receive a share of the profits coming to the trustee as such
special partner. The partnership having become insolvent, its
creditors brought suit against all of the cestuis, upon the ground
that they were liable as general partners because of non-com-
pliance with the statute. The court however dismissed the
claim, holding that the cestuis had no relation whatever to the
partnership, but only to the trust. It stated that the policy of the
limited partnership statute was here subserved since the special
partner in fact made the contribution stated in the partnership
agreement and subjected it to the risks of the business; and that
how he had raised this capital, and his obligation with respect
to the distribution of the partnership profits, were no concern
of the general partners nor of the creditors of the partnership.
The creditors were held to have no standing to attach the validity
of the trust, to which they were entire strangers.
This case clearly shows that there is no conflict between the
limited partnership statutes and Massachusetts trusts. It is
true that the limited partnership statutes furnish a means (and
perhaps the sole means)109 of securing the limited liability of
a partner; but a limited partnership is still a partnership, with
all the partnership incidents except as specifically changed by
the statute.110 On the other hand, as Crehan v. Megargel shows,
a trust is not a partnership, limited or otherwise, and the part-
nership statutes and decisions have no relation to such trusts.
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The law of corporations gives stockholders certain rights to
prevent or control directorate action which might be detrimental
to their interests. Among these are certain limited rights of in-
spection of books, pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new issues
of stock, the right to compel the directors to permit the transfer
of stock upon the books, and in some very unusual cases the
right to remove directors guilty of failure to perform their duty.
These rights are of somewhat uncertain scope and therefore
frequently somewhat unsatisfactory at common law. They are
therefore often regulated by provisions of the certificate of incor-
poration and the by-laws of the corporation.
There is no certainty, of course, that such rights have any
existence at all in the case of Massachusetts Trusts as such. 111
109 But cf. p. 619.
11OAmes v. Downing, 1 Brad. Sur. 321 (New York, 1850).
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This is a question which is not likely to become of great import-
ance, in view of the fact that such matters are generally fully
provided for in the declaration of trust. It is desirable, in order
to avoid any controversies upon the matter, that full provision
be made with respect to all such questions, although, as already
shown,112 provisions for the removal of the trustees are danger-
ous because of the possibility that they may lead the trust to
be considered a partnership.
But even in the absence of such provisions, the certificate
holders are not without remedy. It has been suggested that
their lack of control over the trustees is a serious objection to
the formation of such trusts in that it gives too great scope to
the trustees' action, without responsibility to the security hold-
ers.113 To this it may be answered that the control of stock hold-
ers of directors is very indirect and is not often effective. 114 An
even more pertinent answer is that trustees, as such, are under
probably the most rigid liability known. While cestuis cannot
control the discretion of the trustees, yet it is elementary that
a court of equity will upon application of the cestuis and even
upon its own motion penalize trustees with the utmost severity
for any action considered by the court to fall short of the stand-
ard of due care and of the highest good faith. No provision of
the trust instrument can prevent the cestuis from applying to
the court for relief. This means that the security holders in a
business trust while having perhaps less control over the
trustees than the stockholders of a corporation have over its
directors, are nevertheless even more fully protected against
any improper action by the trustees. 115 It is submitted that if
111 See H. Kramer & Co. v. Cummings, supra, note 43, to the effect that
a Massachusetts trust is not subject to the restrictions of the corpora-
tion laws.
112 See p. 602.
113 See L. S. Duxbury, "Business Trusts and Blue Sky Laws," 8 Minne-
sota Law Review, 465, supra, note 87.
114 In Spraker v. Platt, 158 N. Y. App. Div. 167, 143 N. Y. Supp. 440
(1913) provisions in the articles of association which were intended to,
and in fact did, insure a self-perpetuating Board of Directors, were upheld.
For a good discussion of the similarities and differences between directors
and trustees, see In re Faure Electric Accumulator Co., 40 Ch. D. 141
(1888).
115 See Bumett v. Smith, 240 S. W. 1007 (Texas, 1922) and Phoenix
Oil Co. v. McLarren, supra, note 59, for applications of these principles of
trustee liability to the case of Massachusetts trusts. In Maher v. Land-
reth, 22 F. (2d) 752 (1927), a suit was brought by certain cestuis of a
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control by the security holders is a desirable factor in business
organizations, the Massachusetts trust furnishes from this
aspect a more desirable form of investment than the corporation.
Another matter with respect to which there might well be
disagreement is as to the liability of the certificate holders to
pay up the par amount of their certificates. Ordinarily in the
case of corporations this liability is imposed only for the benefit
of creditors. But in the case of trusts if no agreement is made
to pay in anything additional, it is difficult to see what rights
the creditors have.
Indeed such certificates do not ordinarily have par value and
it is not contemplated that they shall have any qualities analog-
ous to the par value of stock. The interest of the certificate
holder is an interest in the trust assets proportionate to the
amount which he has actually paid for his certificate. In other
words, the certificate, viewed from the aspect of money equival-
ent, is rather a receipt for money paid than a promise to pay
more.1 6 Nevertheless in Dunbar v. Broornfieldl 7 it was held
that the trustees of an insolvent Massachusetts trust could sue
to compel the certificate holders to pay their unpaid subscrip-
tions to an amount necessary to pay the creditors. While this
seems a desirable result it is doubtful where it can be sustained
at common law, without an express provision in the declaration
of trust to this effect, or something from which a contractual lia-
bility of the certificate holder to pay a certain additional amount
may be inferred.
Another matter which has been considered by several courts
is the propriety of investment by fiduciaries in the securities of
Massachusetts trusts. It is submitted that for this purpose the
trust is to be considered as analogous to a corporation; that is to
say, if the securities of a corporation in like financial situation
and with similar management would be suitable for investment
business trust against the trustee for the purpose of surcharging the
trustee with certain losses sustained in the administration of the trust;
the court treated the situation exactly as if it had arisen in a non-business
trust but disallowed the surcharge because of the finding that the defendant
acted in good faith.
116 Of course if the certificate holder is indebted to the trust, the
creditors may take advantage of the debt. All that is here insisted on, is
that there is no obligation, legal or equitable, to pay up an assumed par
value of the certificate. See Sears "trust Estates as Business Companies,"
2d edition, See. 171.
117 247 Mass. 372, 142 N. E. 148 (1924).
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the trust securities are likewise suitable, and vice-versa. This
has usually been the attitude of the courts." 8
One other question, which has received considerable judicial
consideration is the purely procedural one of how a Massachus-
etts trust may sue or be sued. As already shown, it is not an
entity and so cannot, at common law, be sued by its collective
name. There is of course, no objection to statutes permitting
the suit to be brought in the collective name, since even partner-
ships or associations, and any other body of persons not associ-
ated but having a collective name, may thus be sued.119 Mas-
sachusetts120 has such a statute and so has Oklahoma.' 2' Since
however the matter is purely procedural it would seem to be
governed by the law of the forum. Thus it has been held that
a Massachusetts trust could not sue by its collective name in
New York although it of course could in Massachusetts where
it was formed. 22
Allied with this, is the matter of federal jurisdiction through
diversity of citizenship. In this latter question, the turning
point is the consideration of who actually sues or is sued when
a Massachusetts trust is a party litigant. The answer must
obviously be that it is the trustees. They own all of the trust
property and are in control of its business. They therefore
represent the security holders, who need not join or be joined.123
If all of the trustees are citizens of a different state from the
opposite party litigant, the federal court has jurisdiction, not-
withstanding the fact that some of the cestuis may be citizens
of the same state as the opposing party to the suit.12 4
118 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, supra, note 23; Kim-
ball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919).
119 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
A note in 33 Harvard Law Review 298 takes the position that all associa-
tions and business trusts (except ordinary partnerships) should be treated
as entities for procedural purposes, but even associations are not generally
so treated except under the authority of a statute.
120 Bouchard v. First People's Trust, supra, note 19.
121 General American Oil Co. v. Wagoner Oil & Gas Co., 118 Okla. 183,
247 Pac. 99 (1926).
122 Bartley v. Andrews, 208 N. Y. App. Div. 702, 202 N. Y. Supp.
227 (1923). Forgan c. Mackie, supra, note 57, reaches the opposite result as
to a trust formed in Massachusetts and bringing suit in Michigan.
123 Simson v. Klipstein, supra, note 26. See also Simson v. Klipstein,
supra, note 47.
124 Village Mills Co. v. Houston Oil Co., 241 S. W. 122 (Texas, 1922).
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CONCLUSION
It must be clearly evident from this discussion that the Mas-
sachusetts trust has been the subject of widely varying judicial
and other authoritative opinion. Some have held it to be the
ultimate supplanter of the corporation ;125 others as a dangerous
interloper into the business world, which should be promptly
and completely suppressed by law. 126 Neither of these results
have come to pass and it seems probable that neither will. Cor-
porations continue to flourish, and so will trusts. For instance
in Texas where the courts have been the most hostile to such
trusts there are probably a greater number of them organized
than in any other state except perhaps Massachusetts itself-
unfortunately, for the most part, for the exploitation of oil prop-
erties and even more clearly of the unwise persons who invest
therein. This indeed might be considered a serious objection
to such trusts, were it not for the fact that the duly organized
corporations whose stockholders have had similar unfortunate
experiences, is legion.
What then is the place and function in the business world of
the Massachusetts trust? It certainly furnishes a method, alter-
natively with the corporation, of providing for the combination
of small investments to be managed by fiduciaries in a unitary
manner, and with limited liability to the investors. On the other
hand, such limited liability can be secured only by contract so
that a trust is necessarily a somewhat unwieldy organization for
very large businesses. Its distinct advantage is in its greater
flexibility. Not only is it not subject to the rigid and often more
or less unsatisfactory corporation statutes, but its entire scope
and its method of organization may be changed by agreement
and without the necessity of filing papers in public offices or
obtaining the approval of public officials. This does not really
constitute any danger to investors, because of the large scope of
judicial control over trusts (including in proper cases even in-
125 See R. J. Power, "The Passing of the Corporation in Business,"
2 Minnesota Law Review 401.
126 See W. W. Cook, "The Mysterions Massachusetts Trust," 9 Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal 703, supra, note 28; L. S. Duxbury, "Business
Trusts and Blue Sky Laws," 8 Minnesota Law Review 465, supra, note 87.
127 This is a protection to the trustees which directors of a corporation
can never have, except possibly in a few instances where a declaratory
judgment can be obtained. Only a few American jurisdictions have yet
COMMON LAW TRUSTS
structing the trustees before-hand) 127 and also because of gen-
eral regulatory statutes, such as Blue Sky Laws, which relate
to trusts as well as to corporations. Furthermore the declara-
tion of trust can and should be carefully drawn so as to provide
quite fully for all matters whidh are otherwise likely to give rise
to controversy between trustees and cestuis. It would seem that
trusts should not be used in states like Indiana, where their
legality and effect is doubtful, until this question is definitely
settled, although as shown above the practice in Texas has not
been thus conservative. Statutes with respect to business trusts
are perfectly proper if they are similar to the present Oklahoma
and Massachusetts statutes, which provide for recording the
declaration of trust, suits in the trust name, etc.; but they are
objectionable if they go much further, as a regulation of such
trusts with the particularity frequently encountered in the cor-
poration laws will destroy the chief advantage of the trusts-
the attainment of limited liability with freedom from govern-
mental interference in their method of organization, and greater
flexibility than in the case of corporations.
With these qualifications kept in mind, it would seem proper
to predict that the Massachusetts trust is likely to become an
increasingly popular method of doing business,128 but one which
in the nature of things can be only supplementary to, and can-
not supplant, the corporate form. The trust will best perform
its function in comparatively small businesses where greater
flexibility is desirable and where the circumstances permit great
personal confidence to be accorded to the trustees. Such con-
fidence is necessary, because there are no public reports required,
although as a matter of fact the liability of the trustees is even
more stringent than that of directors. The corporation is likely
to hold the field still, where the business done is very large, and
particularly where it is spread into a number of states. Here
the very rigidity of the corporation laws and the requirement
of periodical public reports is a valuable protection to the secur-
ity holders, as well as to creditors. The trust is a method of
getting corporation results by agreement, and it has the disad-
vantage of requiring complete agreement beforehand on all im.
portant details. On the other hand there is no possible reason
provided for a declaratory judgment and it is doubtful whether such stat-
utes, even when enacted, will have much effect in intra-corporation diffi-
culties.
128 See p. 596.
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for the state to object to the doing of business on such terms,
when it is practically possible, and it is believed that all juris-
dictions will eventually reach this sensible conclusion. When
that happens, corporations and trusts will both have a proper
place in the general business organization and both in their own
sphere will perform useful functions.
